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Social versus conservative 
democracies and  homicide rates 
Marcus Marktanner  and Luc Noiset 
Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia, USA 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The  purpose  of this  paper  is to critique  recent  findings  that  democratic  practices  are positively 
related to homicide rates. 
Design/methodology/approach – Economic   rational   choice   model   supported    by   empirical evidence. 
Findings – It was found that higher homicide rates are only characteristic of democracies that fail to respond  to 
the median voter’s call for equitable social development. 
Originality/value – The  paper  makes  an  original  distinction   between  conservative   and  social 
democracies,  operationalizes  this  distinction  theoretically  and  empirically,  and  shows  that  higher homicide 
rates are a phenomenon  of conservative,  not social, democracies. 
Keywords Murder, Democracy, Income distribution,  Political economics, Crime, Social economics 
Paper type Research paper 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In his background paper to the 2011 World Bank Development Report Fearon (2011) notes, 
as others have earlier, that income inequality is a determinant of homicide rates (Blau and 
Blau, 1982; Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1980; Neumayer, 2003; LaFree and Tseloni, 2006; Hall 
and McLean, 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). He further notes that democracies tend to 
have higher homicide rates than autocratic countries. These observations are indeed 
puzzling. 
Economic theory predicts that democracies should have less income inequality than 
authoritarian  regimes. In democratic countries, the poorer majority can presumably vote for 
policies that tax the richer minority to limit the degree of income inequality; thus one would 
expect both less income inequality and lower homicide rates in more democratic  countries,  
not  the  other  way  around.  Of course,  this  simple  view  of democracy is not always 
realized in the face of the complexities of real world politics. In reality, democracies around the 
world differ from each other in many significant ways. Since democracies are not homogeneous 
entities, it may be promising to explore 
whether different types of democracies generate different homicide rates. This is the objective 
of this study. 
Although many studies point to income inequality as a robust explanatory variable for  
homicide  rates  across  societies,  the  nexus  between  income  inequality  and the 
characteristics of democracies is more difficult to establish. This study uses the widely 
applied  “polity score” from the  Center for Systemic Peace to characterize democracies. 
The polity score classifies procedural characteristics  of regimes on a spectrum from 
autocracy to democracy on a scale ranging from 2 10 to þ 10. This study gives particular 
attention to regimes with an average polity score greater than five between 1960 and 2008. All 
regimes within this range are considered established democracies. 
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By regressing  the polity score of established  democracies on country-level Gini 
coefficients, we show that established democracies with higher polity scores do in fact have, on 
average, lower income inequality. Mirroring a classification suggested  by Hsu (2008), we then 
use a residual analysis to identify countries with positive and negative residuals as 
conservative and social democracies, respectively. Using these residuals, an index is created 
that reflects the degree to which each democracy can be classified as  a  more conservative  
democracy  on the  one hand,  or  a  more social democracy on the other. Empirical results 
using this index as an explanatory variable suggest that higher homicide rates are 
characteristic of conservative, but not of social, democracies. These  findings  allow  for  the  
conclusion  that  it  is  not  more  fully institutionalized democratic procedures and civil 
freedoms that correlate with higher homicide rates, but  rather  the failure of some 
democracies to translate  democratic procedures, institutions and freedoms into equitable 
social development. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the large literature  on the determinants  of homicide rates. In Section 3, a simple rational 
choice economic model is presented in which democracies that are 
unable to provide equitable social development produce higher homicide rates. The 
presentation  and discussion of the empirical results  follow in Section 4. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
The criminology literature explains homicide rates with demographic, socio-economic, and 
political factors. One of the first researched variables was age. Neison (1846) and 
Goring’s (1913) work on England and Wales were probably the first comprehensive 
studies in this regard. Their studies found that most murderers belonged to the age group  
between  16 and  25. More recently,  Pampel  and  Gartner  (1995) provide  a 
comprehensive literature review of the age-homicide nexus, giving special emphasis to 
the interaction between age and several socio-economic variables. 
Urbanization is another factor that receives particular  attention. Lodhi and Tilly 
(1973) study the crime rates of early nineteenth century France. The authors find no evidence 
that urbanization produces more tension and crime. Jalil and Iqbal (2010), however, argue 
that urbanization has increased crime rates in Pakistan. Theoretical 
arguments  can be made in either direction. Urbanization  is associated  with  more 
poverty and points to a direct effect between urbanization and crime rates. The counter 
argument is that urbanization brings about development and jobs. Generalizations in 
this area are therefore difficult to make. 
The literature further discusses inequality as an explanatory factor. Perhaps one of the 
most thoughtful studies of the relationship between homicide rates and inequality 
is that of Braithwaite and Braithwaite (1980). The authors find, using cross-sectional 
regression analysis, that homicide rates and several inequality measures are strongly 
correlated. They also find that  the legacy of social democratic parties is related to 
homicide rates, “although the correlation was not as strong as with income inequality” (p. 52). 
This  finding suggests  that  the analysis  of the interaction between regime 
characteristics and inequality, as carried out in this study, may offer new insights. 
In another study, Blau and Blau (1982), find that alleged racial and geographical patterns of 
violence in the USA become insignificant once one controls for economic 
inequality.  Also using  US data,  Brush  (2007) finds  that  levels of inequality  and 
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homicide rates are positively associated. Surprisingly, however, the same regressions on  
differences generate  negative  results.  Referencing Levitt  (2004), Brush  (2007) suggests  
that  this is most likely due to unmeasured  time-specific effects like more policing, rising  
incarceration  rates,  declining  crack  consumption,  and  legalizing abortion that were 
absorbed by the coefficient on income inequality. 
Political characteristics are often behind demographic and socioeconomic factors. 
Neumayer  (2003) reports  evidence for  good  governance  to  reduce  violent  crime. 
Pridemore and Kim (2006) explain the increase in homicide rates in Russia during the 
transformation process by applying Durkheim’s (1893) anomie theory and linking it to 
a highly significant index of negative socioeconomic change. Closely related, Lafree and 
Tseloni (2006, p. 30) find that countries in transition to free markets experience an 
increase in homicide rates, and they note that, “a growing number of regional studies are 
consistent with the idea that  democratization has been associated with rapidly 
increasing violent crime rates.” They also find that homicide rates have increased for 
many democracies in the second half of the twentieth century. The impact of democracy on 
various crime severities is examined by Lin (2007), who finds that less 
severe  crimes  are  more  common  in  democracies  and  more  severe  crimes,  like 
homicides, less common; a finding at odds with the findings of Fearon (2011) and 
LaFree  and  Tseloni  (2006). Finally,  Hall  and  McLean (2009) look  at  structural 
characteristics of democracies in a study more closely related to the analysis presented in this 
paper. They argue that US neoliberalism is more prone to the spread of violence 
than Western Europe’s social democracies, and they state that it: 
 
[. . .] seems quite likely that over 90 per cent of US homicides in known circumstances can be 
associated in one way or another with economic motivations and/or situations and locales defined  
principally  by  their  disadvantaged   positions  in  the  socio-economic structure (Hall and McLean, 
2009, p. 315). 
 
3. A simple rational choice model of homicide and  economic gain 
The widespread  empirical evidence that  homicide rates  and income inequality  are 
positively correlated suggests that there might be some validity to Hall and McLean 
(2009) conjecture. The model assumes a median voter framework where the median voter is 
decisive and so determines government policy (Downs, 1957; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2002). In the model, homicide rates are higher as the “voice” of the median 
voter is less successful in ameliorating excessive inequality. 
The  model assumes  two  stages.  In  stage  one, the  median  voter  chooses  the tax-
transfer  policy assuming  that  all citizens are non-criminal members of society. Once the tax-
transfer system is determined, each citizen chooses between remaining 
in civil society and exiting into the homicide class. This means that citizens choosing to 
exit into the homicide class implicitly increase the available funds for redistribution to the 
remaining members of the society. While this might suggest a continuous need for 
re-optimization by the median voter, the marginal effects on the transfer amount can be 
assumed  to be infinitesimal given actual  sizes of criminal classes relative to total 
populations and are ignored for the purpose of this paper. 
Consider an individual who needs to make a choice between joining the “homicide class”  
(i.e. becoming a murderer, for example, by joining a gang) and exiting civil society, 
or  remaining  a  peaceful democratic  citizen. A  murderer  anticipates  an  economic 
reward,  R,  by  joining  the  homicide class,  or  equally  by  committing  a  murder. 
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Based on conditions (1) and (2), a citizen will choose to become a murderer if: 
t * 2pR 2 ð1 2 pÞ S . ð1 2 t * Þy þ t * 2 2v                                ð3Þ
The left hand side of inequality (equation (3)) is the net gain from joining the homicide class, the 
right hand side (RHS) is the net benefit from being a member of civil society. The left hand side 
of equation (3) is straightforward  to interpret: an increase in the likelihood of escaping 
punishment  will increase homicide rates, a higher expected sentence decreases it. 
The individual for whom equation (3) holds with equality, is the marginal citizen who is 
indifferent between joining the homicide class and remaining in civil society. In Figure 1, this  
individual is identified at point PS *, which defines, respectively, the population shares of the 
homicide class and civil society. Figure 1 shows a typical pre- and post-tax income 
distributions. 
The tax authority will implement the median voter’s optimum tax rate, determined by 
maximizing equation (2) with respect to t. The optimum proportional tax rate t * applied to all 
citizens will then be: 
 
t * ¼ vð1 2 ym Þ                                                                                       ð4Þ 
 
 
 
Pre-tax 
income 
 
Post 
redistribution 
income 
 
 
 
1                                                                                         mean income 
post-tax median income 
pre-tax median income 
 
pR-1-p)S 
 
 
t* = v (1-ym) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Determination  of size of 
homicide class 
PS* 
Homicide 
class 
share 
 
50 
 
Non-violent 
population 
share 
Population 
Share (PS)
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where ym is the median income. Because the median income is smaller than 1 (the mean income) 
and v is at most 1, the tax  rate is defined between 0 and 1. Equation  (4) captures the 
intuition that tax rates will be high when democratic voice is high and/or when inequality is 
high. As alluded to above, the poorer majority is able to tax the rich in order to redistribute 
income. The utility of a typical member of civil society will be maximized when v ¼ 1, in which 
case t * ¼ 1 2 ym. 
The derivative of the rhs of equation (3) with respect to the optimum tax rate and 
separately with respect to voice, shows that an increase of either factor increases the net 
benefit from redistribution for citizens with incomes less than the median income. 
The share of the population joining the homicide class decreases accordingly. 
Specifically, taking the derivative on the rhs with respect to t * and using equation (3) 
gives the following result:
 
 
drhs 
. 0   if    ym  . y
dt * ¼ 2y þ ym 
¼ 0   if    ym  ¼ y 
, 0   if    ym  , y 
ð5Þ
 
Hence, the net benefit from increasing the redistributive tax is positive (negative) for people 
with incomes lower (greater) than the median income. This result can also be seen from equation 
(4), which shows that as the spread between the average income, which is 1, and the median 
income grows (falls), the optimum tax rate increases (decreases). 
Similarly, a marginal increase in voice generates the partial derivative: 
 
. 0   if  y ,  1 þy m  
 drhs  
dv  ¼ 
ð   1 2 y m Þ½ 1 2 2y  þ  y 
m     
2 
 
¼ 0   if  y ¼ 
 
1    þym   
2 
 
ð6Þ
, 0   if  y .  1 þy m   
 
Condition (6) implies that more voice, as expected, delivers a net gain to the poor. But since ym  
is smaller than 1, more voice does not benefit all citizens with incomes less than the average 
income. The lower is the median income, and therefore the higher is the inequality, the lower 
is the income threshold below which an increase in voice increases the net utility from 
redistribution. In other words, this implies the interesting result that in higher inequality 
countries, a marginal increase in voice benefits fewer people,  which in turn  suggests  that  a  
greater  share  of the  population  resorts  to redistribution activities outside the political 
process such as criminal behavior. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Data and methodology 
The above model captures the idea that democracies with lower responsiveness to the voice 
of the  median  voter  are  likely to  have  a  weaker  “social contract,” which contributes  to  
higher  levels  of  economic inequality  and  higher  homicide  rates. 
To determine whether or not the empirical evidence supports  this notion, data was collected 
across countries for per capita GDP, income inequality, polity, tax revenue, median age, 
conflict history,  and  type  of democracy. Countries were identified as 
democracies, according to Hsu’s (2008) classification. She defines democracies as such when 
they hold “fair, multiparty elections.” Building upon a classification proposed by 
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Esping-Andersen  (1990), she further  labels democracies as  conservative  if “status 
differentials are preserved” or “modest social-insurance plans dominate” and as social 
democracies when “universal social rights are expanded” (Hsu, 2008, pp. 8-10). 
Only those democracies with available data for all variables were included, which left the final 
dataset with 89 countries. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are 2000-2008 
averages. The country observations can be placed into the following geographic areas: Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East  and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), East Asia and 
the Pacific (EAP), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and  
Western Europe and  North America (WENA).  The Appendix 
contains a more detailed data description and the complete data set. Table I shows the number 
of observations by region as well as regional averages for the variables. It is apparent  that  
there  are  significant  regional  differences. Among  the  variables,  the 
percentage of social democracy per region is particularly interesting. The table reveals that social 
democracies fall exclusively into the WENA cluster. (In fact, what is not revealed is that  all North 
American countries are classified by Hsu as conservative democracies, thus making social 
democracies in principle only a Western European phenomenon). 
Table I also shows that income inequality, as represented by the Gini index, will likely be 
a strong predictor of homicide rates. The WENA regional cluster has both the lowest homicide 
rate and the highest share of social democracies, while the LAC group 
has both the highest homicide rate and highest share of conservative democracies. This 
observation foretells the critical result in the empirical analysis to follow. 
Fearon (2011, p. 1) says: 
 
Homicide rates tend to be higher in democracies versus autocracies. This is true both across 
countries and when we look at the effect of transitions to democracy within countries. This may be a causal 
effect – it may be that authoritarian states have more aggressive, oppressive, and/or competent police 
forces than do typical new democracies, making for less crime in general. It could also be a 
measurement issue – perhaps autocracies are less inclined to report homicides. 
 
 
Region                                                          SSA     MENA      SA       EAP       CEE      LAC     WENA 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita 
 
 
 
1,855 
 
 
 
16,826 
 
 
 
2,001 
 
 
 
4,570 
 
 
 
9,714 
 
 
 
7,255 
 
 
 
33,316 
Tax revenues (percentage of GDP) 15.6 19.0 9.4 14.0 17.3 14.4 19.0 
  2 2.7 1.0 2.9 5.7 8.2 10.0 
Social democracy percentagea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.8 
Conservative  democracy percentagea 55.6 14.3 42.9 71.4 78.9 94.4 69.2 
MEPV total civil violence and war        
conflict score (sum of 1980-2008        
 
Table I. 
Regional characteristics of 
dataset  (2000-2008 
averages,  unless indicated 
otherwise) 
Notes: aThe sum of the percentages  of social and conservative  democracy does not add up to one as Hsu 
considers  other regime classifications  as well, namely  dictatorship,  military  dictatorship,  civil war, one party  
democracy, communist,  Islamic republic, and European  colony; SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA – Middle 
East and North Africa, SA – South Asia, EAP  – East Asia and the Pacific, CEE – Central and Eastern Europe, 
LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean, and WENA – Western Europe and North America
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nother conclusion that may be warranted is that it is not democracy that fertilizes the il for 
homicides, but  the failure of the established  social contract  to adequately feguard 
against  the vagaries of socioeconomic inequities. Hall and McLean (2009) ake this 
argument in a comparison between the USA and Europe, but argue mostly uristically.  The  
empirical  evidence  provided  below  lends  empirically  stronger pport to their claims. 
The polity score variable is used by Fearon (2011) and others to measure the degree of 
mocracy, but the polity score only captures democratic procedures. Democracies with 
milar polity scores can have different established beliefs and traditions with respect to 
e nature of the social contract. If it is not democratic procedures, but the nature of the cial 
contract reflected in economic inequality measures, which explain differences in 
omicide rates, taking into account income inequality measures across democracies 
ould eliminate the significance of the coefficient on the polity score variable. 
In a first step, the dataset is limited to observations with an average polity score of eater  
than  5  between  1960  and  2008. This  will  presumably   assure  that  all bservations are 
“consolidated” democracies that hold “fair, multiparty elections.” This 
pproach is used to avoid equating young democracies with established democracies here 
socio-economic dynamics are less turbulent. 
On this restricted sample, the following regression is run: 
 
Ginii jPolity2.5  ¼ b0  þ b1 Polityð1960 2 2008 averageÞi  þ ui                           ð7Þ 
 
nd the residuals ui are stored. The residuals can be interpreted as inequality that is not plained 
by the level of procedural democracy. 
We then test whether countries with positive (negative) residuals are, on average, 
ore likely conservative (social) democracies. This is done by regressing the residuals om 
equation (7) on Hsu’s (2008) classification of countries as social and conservative mocracies 
(abbreviated by SD and CD, respectively): 
 
ui jPolity2.5  ¼ g0 þ g1 SDi þ g2 CDi þ 1i                                                  ð8Þ 
 
he regression results in Table II illustrate that, despite the small sample size, Hsu’s 
008) social democracy dummy provides some explanation for the negative residuals. 
Although  Hsu’s  (2008) dataset   is  a  valuable  motivation  for  this  paper,  her 
assifications  involve  a  degree  of  subjectivity.  An  alternative  perspective  that 
rresponds closely to Hsu’s (2008) classification, but interacts directly with available equality 
data, is to classify countries with positive residuals, ui, in equation (7) as nservative, and 
those with negative residuals as social democracies. Two democracy 
 
V ¼ ui                                                                                                                                                                                                               Model 1 
 
tercept                                                                                                                                     2 6.10 (3.75) 
cial democracy dummya                                                                                                                                               2 7.54 * (4.17) 
21 
2                                                                                                                                                                                                                           0.15 
otes: Significant at: *p , 10, * *p , 5 and  * * *p , 1 percent; aonly Hsu’s social democracy dummy as 
regressed  because of perfect multicollinearity;  all observations in the sample  classify  as either cial or 
conservative  democracy (Appendix); SE in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  II. 
Explaining  the residuals 
with Hsu’s (2008) social 
democracy dummies 
(equation (8))
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(PT) 
 
2015 
 
May 
18 
 
09:37 
At 
 
 
 
University 
 
State 
 
 
 
Ke
nne
saw 
by 
 
 
 
 
Downloaded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inequality v 
democracy 
for countrie 
  
  
j 
G
in
i 
 
 
 
type indices are thus computed (one for the ui  . 0 and one for the ui  , 0), using the following 
normalization: 
Democracy  Type  ¼    ju i  j  2  j u min j   jumax j 2 jumin j 
 
£ 10 with  j 
 
 
ð9Þ
¼ ½CSDX ; ui  , 0; CCDX ; ui  . 0  
The  consolidated conservative  democracy  and  the  consolidated social democracy index 
are abbreviated CCDX and CSDX, respectively. Thus, each index ranges from 
0 to 10. A higher number suggests a greater inclination toward safeguarding against 
socioeconomic inequities (social democratic policies) on the one hand, or toward fewer 
safeguards (conservative democratic policies) on the other. In a final step, the CSDX 
and  the CCDX were added  to model specifications similar to those performed by Fearon 
(2011). In other words, our regression includes in addition to all observations with a polity 
score between 2 10 and þ 10, which captures  procedural democracy 
characteristics,  a variable for consolidated conservative and social democracy as a proxy 
for substantive democracy. Tables III-V summarize the empirical results. 
Table III shows that more democratic countries have, on average, lower levels of income 
inequality as predicted by economic theory. The scatter plot also shows that 
mostly  Latin  American  countries  can  be found  above  the  trend  line, specifically 
Colombia (COL), Venezuela (VEN),  Jamaica  ( JAM),  and  Costa  Rica  (CRI),  while 
European countries are generally below it. 
Before turning to the discussion of using democracy-classification variables (CCDX 
and CSDX) in the regressions, a look at the bivariate  correlation coefficients of all 
 
DV ¼ Gini              Model             Scatter plot 
 
Constant                67.90 * * *  
(10.4) 
 
 
Gini vs. Avg. Polity Score 1960-2008
Polity                   2 3.36 * * *  
(1.15) 
n                            21 
R 2                                         0.31 
60.0 
 
 
 
 
48.3 
 
ZAF 
 
COL 
 
 
 
 
 
VEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JAM 
 
 
 
 
 
CRI
 
 
36.7 
 
LKA 
TUR  
 
IND 
 
ISR 
 
USA 
 
 
ITA
GRC                                                                                     ICRHLE BCEALN 
 
 
25.0 
AUT DEU 
FIN 
NOR SWE
ersus 
(equation (7)) s 
with 
ity score . 5 
60 and 2008 
5.0          6.0          7.0          8.0          9.0         10.0        11.0 
Polity 
 
 
Notes: Significant  at:  *p , 10, * *p , 5 and  * * *p , 1 percent; SE in parentheses
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  lnHC 
 
lnyPPP 
 
Polity2 
 
MedAge 
 
Urban 
 
Gini 
 
TaxRev 
 
CivViol 
 
CSDX 
 
CCDX 
 
SSA 
 
MENA 
 
SA 
 
EAP 
 
CEE 
 
LAC 
 
WENA 
 
lnHC 
 
1.00 
 
2 0.44 
 
0.05 
 
2 0.52 
 
2 0.17 
 
0.66 
 
2 0.14 
 
0.14 
 
2 0.37 
 
0.31 
 
0.32 
 
2 0.34 
 
2 0.07 
 
0.00 
 
2 0.06 
 
0.50 
 
2 0.68 
lnyPPP 2 0.44 1.00 0.38 0.82 0.75 2 0.26 0.35 2 0.27 0.35 0.13 2 0.60 0.12 2 0.29 2 0.10 0.16 0.07 0.60 
Polity2 0.05 0.38 1.00 0.43 0.40 0.03 0.24 2 0.04 0.24 0.17 2 0.17 2 0.40 2 0.21 2 0.11 0.06 0.28 0.05 
MedAge 2 0.52 0.82 0.43 1.00 0.56 2 0.53 0.28 2 0.23 0.38 2 0.02 2 0.59 2 0.07 2 0.19 2 0.05 0.45 2 0.17 0.45 
Urban 2 0.17 0.75 0.40 0.56 1.00 2 0.02 0.18 2 0.28 0.11 0.15 2 0.45 0.20 2 0.45 2 0.13 0.07 0.32 0.43 
Gini 0.66 2 0.26 0.03 2 0.53 2 0.02 1.00 2 0.05 0.06 2 0.35 0.30 0.25 2 0.07 2 0.11 2 0.05 2 0.39 0.68 2 0.41 
TaxRev 2 0.14 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.18 2 0.05 1.00 2 0.30 0.20 0.08 2 0.02 0.14 2 0.29 2 0.08 0.11 2 0.11 0.26 
CivViol 0.14 2 0.27 2 0.04 2 0.23 2 0.28 0.06 2 0.30 1.00 0.05 0.11 2 0.04 2 0.04 0.51 0.13 2 0.11 2 0.07 2 0.21 
CSDX 2 0.37 0.35 0.24 0.38 0.11 2 0.35 0.20 0.05 1.00 2 0.08 2 0.16 2 0.09 0.06 2 0.09 2 0.12 2 0.16 0.44 
CCDX 0.31 0.13 0.17 2 0.02 0.15 0.30 0.08 0.11 2 0.08 1.00 2 0.04 2 0.04 2 0.08 2 0.08 2 0.14 0.33 2 0.04 
SSA 0.32 2 0.60 2 0.17 2 0.59 2 0.45 0.25 2 0.02 2 0.04 2 0.16 2 0.04 1.00 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.26 2 0.25 -0.27 
MENA 2 0.34 0.12 2 0.40 2 0.07 0.20 2 0.07 0.14 2 0.04 2 0.09 2 0.04 2 0.15 1.00 2 0.09 2 0.09 2 0.15 2 0.15 0.54 
SA 2 0.07 2 0.29 2 0.21 2 0.19 2 0.45 2 0.11 2 0.29 0.51 0.06 2 0.08 2 0.15 2 0.09 1.00 2 0.09 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.16 
EAP 0.00 2 0.10 2 0.11 2 0.05 2 0.13 2 0.05 2 0.08 0.13 2 0.09 2 0.08 2 0.15 2 0.09 2 0.09 1.00 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.16 
CEE 2 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.45 0.07 2 0.39 0.11 2 0.11 2 0.12 2 0.14 2 0.26 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.15 1.00 2 0.26 2 0.28 
LAC 0.50 0.07 0.28 2 0.17 0.32 0.68 2 0.11 2 0.07 2 0.16 0.33 2 0.25 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.15 2 0.26 1.00 2 0.27 
WENA 2 0.68 0.60 0.05 0.45 0.43 2 0.41 0.26 2 0.21 0.44 2 0.04 2 0.27 0.54 2 0.16 2 0.16 2 0.28 2 0.27 1.00 
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Constant 2 9.190 * 
 
2 5.414 
 
2 6.316 
 
1.923 
 (4.757) (4.484) (4.350) (4.844) 
lnyPPP 3.064 * * *  2.137 * *  2.438 * *  0.023 
 (1.118) (1.059) (1.037) (1.155) 
lnyPPP2 2 0.209 * * *  2 0.153 * *  2 0.159 * * *  2 0.002 
 (0.065) (0.062) (0.060) (0.068) 
Polity2 0.055 * * *  0.050 * * *  0.059 * * *  0.001 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Gini     
CSDX  2 0.116 * 2 0.070 2 0.013 
  (0.063) 
* * *  
(0.064) 
0.156 * * *  
(0.058) 
0.109 * *  
 
MedAge 
 (0.055) (0.055) 
2 0.061 * * *  
(0.047) 
2 0.049 * 
   (0.021) (0.026) 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
CivViol   2 0.001 0.005 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
TaxRev   2 0.003 0.013 
   (0.016) (0.014) 
WENA    2 0.622 
    (0.596) 
LAC                                                                                                                                                     1.194 * *  
    (0.494) 
CEE    0.642 
    (0.428) 
EAP    0.385 
    (0.442) 
MENA    2 0.529 
 
SSA 
   (0.533) 
0.790 * 
    (0.413) 
Adj. R 2 0.30 0.41 0.46 0.64 
Notes: Significant  at:  *p , 10, * *p , 5 and  * * *p , 1 percent; n ¼ 89; SE in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Model I 
DV ¼  lnHC         (Fearon  specif.  Table  III,  model  I)            Model  II              Model  III            Model  IV  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
kind 
 
 
 
variables used in the subsequent analysis may be useful. Table IV shows the strong direct 
correlation between homicide rates  and  income inequality  (r ¼ 0.66). It also reveals the 
correlations between homicide rates and CSDX and CCDX (r ¼ 2 0.37 and r ¼ 0.31).  Among  
the  regional  fixed  effects, Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean (LAC, r ¼ 0.50)  and  Western 
Europe and  North America (WENA, r ¼ 2 0.68) are prominent. Looking at the control 
variables, the high negative correlation between median age and homicide rates (r ¼ 2 0.52) 
is noteworthy. Table IV also alerts us to possible  multicollinearity  problems.  For  example, 
GDP per  capita  is  particularly strongly correlated with median age (r ¼ 0.82) and 
urbanization (r ¼ 0.75). Lastly, as expected, the CSDX index is fairly highly correlated with the 
Western Europe and North America dummy (r ¼ 0.44) while the CCDX index is correlated with 
the Latin America and Caribbean dummy (r ¼ 0.33).
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Table V presents  initial regression results.  Our econometric objective is to start with 
Fearon’s (2011) specification and then test the robustness of our key variables, which are the 
consolidated social and conservative democracy, by moving from specific to more general 
models. Model I is Fearon’s simplest specification, using per capita income and polity as 
independent variables. Model I reveals the unexpected positive sign for polity. In model II, the 
CSDX and CCDX indices were added, both of which are significant and carry  the expected sign. 
The polity variable is still significant with a positive sign in this specification. Model III adds 
socioeconomic control variables. The CSDX variable is now no longer significant, but still 
carries the expected sign. The loss of significance is likely attributed  to multicollinearity. 
Median age and CSDX have a correlation coefficient of r ¼ 0.38. Both polity and CCDX 
remain significant with the expected sign. Model IV additionally includes regional dummies. In 
model IV, the polity variable is no longer significant while CCDX still is. Despite expected 
multicollinearity with CCDX,  the Latin America and Caribbean dummy  is also significant 
with the expected positive sign. 
Similar to Fearon (2011), models V-VIII in Table VI reproduce specifications I to IV with the 
Gini coefficient included in each model. The Gini variable is significant with a positive sign in all 
models. The addition of the Gini coefficient in model V leaves polity significant and positive. As 
opposed to model II, however, the addition of Gini to model VI renders  CSDX insignificant, 
although  the expected sign prevails. This  is likely attributable to multicollinearity between 
Gini and CSDX. The significance and sign of polity and CCDX is not affected by Gini. Polity and 
CCDX are also significant in model VII while the control variable median age is no longer 
significant. Lastly, the only significant variables in model VIII are Gini, CCDX, and again median 
age (which may be a spurious result given the fact that it is not significant in model VII). 
Fearon’s (2011) finding of a positive relationship between the polity score and homicide rates is, 
at first sight, remarkable. However, the results here show that it is possible to eliminate polity’s 
significance after incorporating the nature of democracy and controlling for socioeconomic variables 
and regional fixed effects. The most robust variables for explaining homicide rates are 
inequality and the CCDX index. For a democracy with relatively high income inequality, CCDX is 
a measure of the distance between its actual and its expected level of income inequality. To the 
extent that the polity variable, which is a measure of the level of democracy, has had explanatory 
power in empirical studies of homicide rates, it is likely the result of a failure to sufficiently take 
into account the differences in income inequality across otherwise seemingly similar democracies. 
The  CSDX variable  performed  weakly,  but  this  is  most  likely  the  result  of 
multicollinearity.  The  problem  of multicollinearity  is  in  fact  omnipresent  in  this 
empirical analysis. Future research may therefore focus on a better understanding  of 
the structural interaction among the right hand side variables. Despite these technical 
concerns, the results lend support to the conclusion that it is not democracy that leads to 
more homicides, but rather the failure of some democracies to provide for equitable 
social development. Ultimately, the  consolidated conservative  democracy index  is highly 
robust and significant in explaining homicide rates. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The   relationship   between  democracy  and   higher   homicide  rates   reported   by 
Fearon (2011) is puzzling. To resolve this puzzle, the main argument  of this paper 
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Constant 2 3.901 2 2.654 2 2.834 3.613 
 (4.032) (3.975) (4.189) (4.826) 
    2 0.658 
 (0.985) (0.967) (1.064) (1.183) 
lnyPPP2 2 0.077 2 0.068 2 0.077 0.033 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.069) 
* *                                      0.036 * *                 0.036                   0.001 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) * (0.020) 
Gini 0.071 * * *  
(0.011) 
0.060 * * *  
(0.012) 
0.055 * * *  
(0.016) 
0.036 
(0.018) * 
CSDX  2 0.055 2 0.043 0.014 
  (0.056) 
* *  
(0.060) (0.059) 
  (0.051) (0.053) (0.046) 
MedAge   2 0.008 2 0.044 * *  
   (0.025) (0.026) 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
TaxRev   2 0.003 0.009 
   (0.015) (0.014) 
WENA    2 0.477 
    (0.589) 
LAC    0.755 
 
CEE 
   (0.532) 
0.806 * 
    (0.456) 
EAP    0.389 
    (0.419) 
MENA    2 0.628 
    (0.525) 
SSA    0.489 
    (0.432) 
Adj. R 2 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.65 
 
Notes: Significant  at:  *p , 10, * *p , 5 and  * * *p , 1 percent; n ¼ 89; SE in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Model V 
DV ¼  lnHC        (Fearon  specif.,  Table  III,  model  II)          Model  VI            Model  VII          Model  VIII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.121 * *                 0.109 * *  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI. Homicides 
and kind of 
democracy 
 
 
is that a more differentiated look at democracy is necessary. We propose that it is not the level 
of procedural democracy itself that is important, which is what the polity IV score emphasizes, 
but rather the more substantive variable that reflects the extent to which democratic policies 
serve as a means for equitable social development. 
We discuss this idea with a simple rational-behavior theoretical model and from an empirical 
perspective. The model suggests a transmission mechanism from less voice to less 
redistribution, which in turn increases a poor citizen’s propensity to seek economic gain through 
violence. Empirically, we capture this idea by distinguishing  between established 
democracies with low and high inequality. We label these two democracy forms as  social and  
conservative  democracies, respectively. The  empirical results suggest that higher homicide 
rates are statistically significantly limited to conservative
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Upon joining the  homicide class,  this  reward  is hidden  from tax  authorities  and 
constitutes the only source of potential income for the murderer. The alternative to gaining  
income from becoming a murderer  is to generate  income in civil society, including 
participation in the democratically established income redistribution process; for example, by 
participating  in a progressive income tax or a redistributive  social pension  system.  The  
model assumes  that  no individual  can  derive  income from participating  in both the 
homicide class and the non-criminal civil society activity. Finally, the economic reward  for 
joining the homicide class is small enough to be appealing only to those individuals with 
initial income smaller than the median income. Thus, from a pure rational choice perspective the 
model provides only the relatively poor individual with an economic incentive to kill another, but 
high income individuals have no incentive to commit murder for economic gain. 
Let the probability of escaping punishment be p. If the assailant gets caught and 
convicted, the sentence is S. A murderer’s utility function, UM, can then be written most 
simply as linear utility function: 
U M  ¼ pR 2 ð1 2 pÞS                                                ð1Þ 
While this utility function assumes risk neutrality, the incorporation of risk aversion would not 
change the comparative static results below. 
The murderer operates in a democracy that provides him with the utility function UD 
if he chooses to remain a member of civil society, specifically: 
t 2 U D ¼ ð1 2 tÞy þ t 2 2v                                             ð2Þ 
Equation  (2), is adopted  with  slight  modification from Boix (2003) and  models a 
democracy in which each citizen pays the proportional tax rate, t, and all tax revenues are 
equally redistributed across members of civil society. This implies that other tax and  
spending  obligations of government  are held constant  in the background.  In particular, tax 
changes do not lead to changes in spending on criminal justice system, thus the probability of 
escaping punishment, p, is exogenous in the model. 
For simplicity, the average income is set to one, so that  each individual gets an amount 
t as a redistribution grant from the government. The empirical fact that income 
distributions are always skewed to the right, meaning that ymode , ymedian , ymean, is also 
adopted here. Everyone with an income lower (higher) than ymean will hence be a net receiver 
(payer) from the redistribution system. 
The third  term on the right hand side of equation (2) indicates that  taxation  is 
associated with distortionary effects, whose size depends positively on the tax rate, t, and on 
an exogenous democracy indicator v, which is not included in Boix (2003) utility function. The 
democracy indicator, v, is defined for 0 , v # 1 and can be interpreted as the median voter’s 
“voice” in the democratic process. If v is 1, the median voter’s preferences are exactly 
implemented by the democratically elected representatives, and the distortionary effect of 
taxation is equal to 1 half of the square of the tax rate. The distortionary effect increases as v 
goes towards zero, implying a weaker governmental responsiveness  to  the  median  voter.  In  
practice, factors  like corruption,  political mistrust, and capital flight contribute to low voice. 
The presence of low democratic voice creates anti-government sentiments, spawning more 
socially costly articulation mechanisms such as popular protests, strikes or riots, which also 
make government (including the tax administration system) less efficient. 
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democracies, which are democracies in which income inequality  is relatively high. These  
conservative  democracies  that  fail  to  create  an  equitable  socioeconomic system have a 
greater likelihood for violence than social democracies and authoritarian regimes. 
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Variable                                                        Transformation                                                Abbreviation   Source 
Log homicide rate per 100,000 
population 
Average of available data for the 2000-2008 
period, natural  log 
lnHC World Bank (n.d.), this dataset  only covers 
countries from Sub-Sahara  Africa, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, 
South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe 
(transitional  economies), and the Middle East 
and North Africa. Data for Western  European  
and North American countries was taken from 
the World Health Organization’s  (n.d.)
Log GDP per capita, PPP ($2,005)           Average of available data for the 2000-2008 period, 
natural  log 
lnyPPP             World Bank Development Indicator 
Database  (2011)
Square of log GDP                                     GDP PPP squared                                              lnyPPP2
Tax revenue as a percentage  of GDP       Average of available data for the 2000-2008 TaxRev
Urban population  (percentage of total) period Urban
Gini index                                                                                                                                 Gini
Polity2 score                                                Average of available data for the 2000-2008 period Polity               Marshall et al. (n.d.)
Dummy for social and conservative 
democracy 
Social democracy (SD) when all observations 
between 2000 and 2005 were labeled as such. 
Similar for conservative democracy (CD) 
SD and CD     Hsu (n.d.)
Median age                                                  In 2009                                                                MedAge           United Nations (n.d.)
Civil total score                                           Sum of all civil and ethnic political violence and war 
scores between 1981 and 2008 
Civtot               Center for Systemic Peace (n.d.)
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Country 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Region 
 
 
Homicide 
 
 
yPPP 
 
 
Polity 
 
 
MedAge 
 
 
Urban 
 
SD 
(Hsu) 
 
CD 
(Hsu) 
 
 
Gini 
 
 
TaxRev   C 
 
 
ivViol  CSDX  CCDX 
 
2         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
21        0.00      0.00 
 
24        0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
12        0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
 
0         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
7         0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
44        0.00      0.00 
0         0.00      0.00 
 
Albania 
 
ALB 
 
CEE 
 
5.7 
 
5,928.2 
 
7.4 
 
29.7 
 
44.2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
31.7 
 
16.82 
Armenia ARM CEE 2.6 3,793.6 5.0 31.8 64.4 0 1 33.36 14.94 
Azerbaijan AZE CEE 2.5 4,560.3 2 7.0 28.2 51.5 0 0 35.11 16.74 
Bosnia and            
Herz. BIH CEE 2.1 6,052.6 0.0 38.9 45.3 0 1 33.34 20.9 
Bulgaria BGR CEE 3.1 9,352.9 8.9 41.5 70.0 0 1 36.3 20.16 
Croatia HRV CEE 3.2 14,784.8 8.4 41.3 56.4 0 1 31.28 20.76 
Estonia EST CEE 9.5 15,321.9 9.0 39.5 69.4 0 0 36.5 15.98 
Hungary HUN CEE 2.4 16,098.4 10.0 39.7 66.0 0 1 28.46 21.28 
Kazakhstan KAZ CEE 13.4 8,067.4 2 5.6 29.3 57.0 0 0 32.75 12.88 
Kyrgyz            
Republic KGZ CEE 8.1 1,717.9 2 0.2 24.8 35.8 0 0 32.68 14.26 
Latvia LVA CEE 8.4 12,202.4 8.0 39.9 68.1 0 1 35.92 14.54 
Lithuania LTU CEE 9.5 13,339.3 10.0 39.4 66.8 0 1 33.99 16.73 
Macedonia MKD CEE 3.5 7,587.0 8.3 35.7 64.9 0 1 39.83 19.78 
Moldova MDA CEE 7.9 2,191.9 7.9 35.0 43.1 0 1 36.81 16.65 
Poland POL CEE 1.9 13,587.6 9.8 37.9 61.5 0 1 33.79 17.04 
Russia RUS CEE 21.6 11,347.2 5.6 37.9 73.1 0 1 39.75 14.85 
Slovenia SVN CEE 1.6 22,994.7 10.0 41.4 49.7 0 1 30.15 20.28 
Turkey TUR CEE 3.8 10,389.7 7.0 28.0 66.7 0 1 41.71 19 35 2.41 0.00 
Ukraine UKR CEE 8.4 5,240.4 6.3 39.4 67.6 0 1 28 15.04 0 0.00 0.00 
China CHN EAP 1.9 3,937.4 2 7.0 33.8 39.5 0 0 41.53 8.69 19 0.00 0.00 
Indonesia IDN EAP 4.0 3,136.1 7.1 27.9 46.8 0 1 38.5 12.29 45 0.00 0.00 
Lao PDR LAO EAP 5.6 1,604.1 2 7.0 20.4 26.4 0 0 34.69 11.24 2 0.00 0.00 
Malaysia MYS EAP 3.9 11,439.0 3.3 26.0 66.4 0 1 37.91 15.57 0 0.00 0.00 
Mongolia MNG EAP 12.6 2,525.4 10.0 25.9 56.8 0 1 34.13 20.65 0 0.00 0.00 
Philippines PHL EAP 8.9 2,861.1 8.0 23.0 61.8 0 1 44.87 13.37 90 0.00 0.00 
Thailand THA EAP 7.3 6,485.9 5.8 32.8 32.1 0 1 42.52 16.32 6 0.00 0.00 
Argentina ARG LAC 7.1 10,669.0 8.0 30.2 91.1 0 1 50.66 12.18 0 0.00 0.00 
Bolivia BOL LAC 16.2 3,607.3 8.3 21.7 63.7 0 1 58.56 15.19 0 0.00 0.00 
Brazil BRA LAC 25.8 8,463.6 8.0 28.6 83.5 0 1 56.96 15.84 0 0.00 0.00 
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Chile 
 
CHL 
 
LAC 
 
5.0 
 
11,771.0 
 
9.3 
 
31.8 
 
87.2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
54.09 
 
18.2 
 
0 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Colombia COL LAC 52.5 7,230.4 7.0 26.5 73.3 0 1 58.27 11.66 76 0.00 10.00 
Costa Rica CRI LAC 7.3 8,953.4 10.0 27.8 61.2 0 1 48.49 15.81 0 0.00 9.10 
Dominican Rep. DOM LAC 15.4 6,263.9 8.0 24.8 65.8 0 1 50.86 14.62 0 0.00 0.00 
El Salvador SLV LAC 44.3 5,642.2 7.0 23.7 59.5 0 1 50.05 12.38 18 0.00 0.00 
Guatemala GTM LAC 36.0 4,101.9 8.0 18.7 46.8 0 1 54.67 11.38 35 0.00 0.00 
Honduras HND LAC 42.6 3,197.2 7.0 20.7 46.1 0 1 55.89 15.06 1 0.00 0.00 
Jamaica JAM LAC 46.8 6,920.7 9.0 26.1 52.5 0 1 46.93 25.74 0 0.00 7.39 
Mexico MEX LAC 21.0 12,525.7 8.0 27.2 76.0 0 1 49.49 11.66 10 0.00 0.00 
Nicaragua NIC LAC 12.0 2,284.4 8.2 21.7 55.7 0 1 51.32 15.86 3 0.00 0.00 
Panama PAN LAC 11.0 9,198.5 9.0 27.1 69.7 0 1 55.87 9.73 0 0.00 0.00 
Paraguay PRY LAC 16.2 3,927.3 7.7 22.8 57.8 0 1 54.27 11.22 0 0.00 0.00 
Peru PER LAC 7.4 6,280.8 8.6 25.3 71.0 0 0 51.94 13.58 24 0.00 0.00 
Uruguay URY LAC 5.1 9,686.3 10.0 33.5 91.8 0 1 45.43 17.03 0 0.00 0.00 
Venezuela VEN LAC 39.0 9,865.7 5.8 25.8 91.7 0 1 46.44 12.67 0 0.00 2.81 
Egypt EGY MENA 0.6 4,342.2 2 4.7 23.6 42.6 0 0 32.45 14.45 8 0.00 0.00 
Iran IRN MENA 3.1 9,040.0 2 2.0 26.3 66.4 0 0 38.28 6.69 16 0.00 0.00 
Israel ISR MENA 3.9 23,442.2 10.0 29.5 91.6 0 1 39.2 27.31 38 0.00 1.75 
Jordan JOR MENA 2.4 4,209.5 2 2.2 22.4 78.3 0 0 38.3 20.37 0 0.00 0.00 
Morocco MAR MENA 0.6 3,427.6 2 6.0 25.8 54.7 0 0 40.76 22.36 0 0.00 0.00 
Qatar QAT MENA 0.9 67,025.0 2 10.0 30.1 95.3 0 0 41.1 20.74 0 0.00 0.00 
Tunisia TUN MENA 1.4 6,292.5 2 3.8 28.6 64.9 0 0 40.81 21.18 0 0.00 0.00 
Afghanistan AFG SA 3.4 795.5 2 0.8 16.8 22.6 0 0 29.4 5.6 84 0.00 0.00 
Bangladesh BGD SA 3.0 1,041.4 3.3 24.1 25.3 0 1 30.87 8.09 6 0.00 0.00 
Bhutan BTN SA 2.4 3,425.9 2 7.2 23.8 29.9 0 0 46.74 8.91 6 0.00 0.00 
India IND SA 3.6 2,205.3 9.0 24.7 28.6 0 1 36.8 9.85 139 1.39 0.00 
Nepal NPL SA 4.9 949.0 0.7 21.3 15.3 0 0 47.3 9.17 22 0.00 0.00 
Pakistan PAK SA 5.8 2,110.1 2 3.3 21.0 34.6 0 0 31.44 10.03 35 0.00 0.00 
Sri Lanka LKA SA 7.7 3,482.8 5.6 30.3 15.3 0 1 40.66 13.85 99 4.92 0.00 
Benin BEN SSA 11.4 1,316.8 6.3 18.3 39.7 0 1 38.62 15.98 0 0.00 0.00 
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Burkina  Faso 
 
BFA 
 
SSA 
 
3.4 
 
1,006.8 
 
2 0.3 
 
16.7 
 
18.0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
39.6 
 
11.69 
 
0 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Cape Verde CPV SSA 6.5 2,648.6 9.8 20.9 56.6 0 1 50.4 22.97 0 0.00 0.00 
Cen. Afr. Rep. CAF SSA 26.3 693.0 1.0 19.4 38.0 0 0 43.57 6.21 9 0.00 0.00 
Congo, Rep. COG SSA 17.5 3,414.2 2 4.3 19.4 59.8 0 0 47.32 7.72 12 0.00 0.00 
Ghana GHA SSA 4.1 1,174.1 6.7 20.4 47.0 0 1 42.76 17.1 1 0.00 0.00 
Kenya KEN SSA 6.1 1,332.6 5.6 18.3 20.6 0 1 47.68 17.52 9 0.00 0.00 
Lesotho LSO SSA 25.2 1,209.6 7.3 19.6 22.7 0 1 52.5 47.97 0 0.00 0.00 
Liberia LBR SSA 24.8 381.0 3.0 18.4 57.3 0 0 38.16 0.27 36 0.00 0.00 
Madagascar MDG SSA 10.8 893.3 7.0 18.3 28.3 0 1 47.36 10.53 0 0.00 0.00 
Nigeria NGA SSA 3.6 1,663.4 4.0 18.5 45.5 0 1 42.93 0.2 32 0.00 0.00 
Senegal SEN SSA 5.0 1,559.5 7.8 17.9 41.4 0 1 40.22 16.12 8 0.00 0.00 
Sierra Leone SLE SSA 12.8 608.2 4.6 18.3 36.6 0 0 42.52 10.95 33 0.00 0.00 
South Africa ZAF SSA 45.2 8,443.7 9.0 24.7 58.8 0 1 57.77 26.02 21 0.00 5.76 
Swaziland SWZ SSA 31.6 4,267.1 2 9.0 19.1 24.0 0 0 50.68 25.5 0 0.00 0.00 
Togo TGO SSA 12.1 778.1 2 2.9 19.6 39.2 0 0 34.41 15.13 0 0.00 0.00 
Uganda UGA SSA 10.6 893.1 2 2.7 15.5 12.5 0 0 44.2 11.49 34 0.00 0.00 
Zambia ZMB SSA 11.6 1,108.7 4.8 16.8 35.0 0 1 46.41 17.28 0 0.00 0.00 
Austria AUT WENA 0.8 33,342.2 10.0 41.4 66.4 1 0 29.15 20.57 0 3.60 0.00 
Belgium BEL WENA 1.6 31,807.3 9.6 41.1 97.3 1 0 32.97 26 0 0.78 0.00 
Canada CAN WENA 1.5 34,347.4 10.0 39.6 80.0 0 1 32.56 13.94 0 0.89 0.00 
Finland FIN WENA 2.2 30,217.3 10.0 41.8 62.2 0 1 26.88 22.57 0 5.40 0.00 
Germany DEU WENA 0.7 31,668.1 10.0 43.9 73.4 0 1 28.31 11.4 0 4.27 0.00 
Greece GRC WENA 0.9 23,923.6 10.0 41.3 60.3 0 1 34.27 20.71 0 10.00 0.00 
Ireland IRL WENA 0.9 37,009.3 10.0 34.3 60.2 0 1 34.28 24.67 0 0.00 0.00 
Italy ITA WENA 0.9 28,219.6 10.0 43.0 67.6 0 1 36.03 22.36 0 0.00 1.12 
Norway NOR WENA 0.9 46,341.8 10.0 38.7 76.9 1 0 25.79 28.11 0 6.27 0.00 
Spain ESP WENA 1.0 26,943.3 10.0 39.9 76.7 0 1 34.66 13.23 0 0.00 0.00 
Sweden SWE WENA 1.0 31,884.1 10.0 40.7 84.3 1 0 25 21.93 0 6.90 0.00 
Switzerland CHE WENA 0.8 35,834.2 10.0 41.6 73.3 0 1 33.68 10.29 0 0.00 0.00 
USA USA WENA 6.5 41,564.3 10.0 36.5 80.4 0 1 40.81 10.99 0 0.00 4.18 
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